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Hurd: Promoting Private Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act and the Ma

PROMOTING PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE VOTING
RIGHTS ACT AND THE MATERIALITY PROVISION:
CONTRASTING NORTHEAST OHIO COALITION FOR THE
HOMELESS V. HUSTED AND SCHWIER V. COX
Megan Hurd*

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has a long, dark history surrounding the use of
voting laws to disenfranchise minority voters. The Voting Rights Act
(“VRA”) was enacted to protect the civil rights of individuals within the
jurisdiction of the United States.1 Among the many protections provided
by the VRA is the guarantee that an individual will not be denied the
right to vote based on an error on a voter registration form that is
immaterial to determining whether that individual is qualified to vote.2
This guarantee is referred to as the “Materiality Provision” of the VRA.3
The VRA exists to protect the rights of individuals, but courts are
divided as to whether those individuals can enforce those rights
themselves, or whether they must rely on the Attorney General to
enforce those rights on their behalf.
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits divide over how to interpret the
enforcement mechanism for the VRA. These courts have taken
diverging approaches, embodied in Northeast Ohio Coalition for the
Homeless v. Husted, a Sixth Circuit case, and Schwier v. Cox, an
Eleventh Circuit case.4 This Comment reviews the split of authority by
analyzing these cases. Part II of this Comment begins with an overview
of the doctrine surrounding the judicial implication of private rights of
action in federal courts, followed by an explanation of the VRA and the
Sixth and Eleventh Circuit cases. Part III analyzes the differing views of
the private right of action under the VRA.5 Finally, Part IV explains
why individuals should be granted a private right of action under the
VRA.

* Associate Member, 2016-2017 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957).
2. 52 U.S.C.S. § 10101(a)(2)(B) (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through PL 115-60, approved
9/15/17).
3. E.g., Reply Brief for Petitioners, Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 137 S. Ct. 2265
(2017) (cert. denied); Brief of the Brennan Center for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners,
Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 137 S. Ct. 2265 (2017) (cert. denied) [hereinafter Brief for
the Brennan Center of Justice].
4. 837 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2016); 340 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2003).
5. 52 U.S.C.S. § 10101 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through PL 115-60, approved 9/15/17).
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II. BACKGROUND
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits divide over the procedural
enforcement mechanism for similar claims under the “Materiality
Provision” of the VRA. Part A of this section provides an overview of
the individual private right of action as an enforcement mechanism for
federal statutes. Part B provides a brief explanation of the VRA. Finally,
Part C delves into the main cases that exemplify the split of authority:
Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Husted and Schwier v.
Cox.6
A. Private Rights of Action
When Congress creates legislation, it has the option to include an
enforcement mechanism within the statute. Some statutes explicitly state
that private parties may sue to seek redress for harm suffered when their
rights are violated.7 In other federal statutes, Congress creates rights
without stating “whether or how private litigants may bring federal
lawsuits to vindicate those rights.”8 If a federal statute does not
expressly authorize suit by private persons, the courts will have to
determine whether to recognize the lawsuit—a remedy not expressly
authorized by the statute.9
A private right of action is “a non-governmental litigant’s ability to
bring suit to enforce a federal statute.”10 Put differently, a private right
of action is “the right of a private party to seek judicial relief from
injuries caused by another’s violation of a legal requirement.”11 From
early on in American history, the Supreme Court recognized that “where
there is a legal right, there is also a legal remedy.”12 The Supreme Court
later expressly held that a plaintiff could sue under a federal statute that
did not expressly create a private right of action.13
The question then becomes when may an individual sue to enforce a
federal statute that does not expressly provide for a private right of
action. There are two ways in which a court allows a private right of
6. 837 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2016); 340 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2003).
7. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 723 (7th ed.
2015).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of Federal
Election Laws, 44 Ind. L. Rev. 113, 113 n. 1 (2010). A private right of action is also sometimes referred
to as a “private cause of action.” Id.
11. Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 730 n. 1 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
12. Tokaji, supra note 10, at 126 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803)).
13. Id. (citing Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 41 (1916)).
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action when it is not explicitly permitted by the statute: (1) by implying
a private right of action into the statute, or (2) by incorporating the
private right of action by reference using 42 U.S.C. § 1983.14 Section
1983 confers a right of action on individuals “whose rights under federal
laws have been violated by a person acting . . . under color of state
law.”15 The Supreme Court has greatly limited each of these methods
for a court to find a private right of action, beginning in 1975.16
Each of the two ways in which a court may infer a private right of
action begins with the same inquiry: “whether Congress intended to
create a federal right.”17 Under the modern, restrictive view of implied
rights of action, courts focus narrowly on whether the statutory language
shows congressional intent to create both an individual right and a
private remedy.18
When deciding whether an individual may bring a right of action
under § 1983, courts look to whether Congress intended to confer an
individual right in the legislation, not necessarily a remedy.19 If a statute
includes a private remedy, the Supreme Court has held that there is a
presumption that enforcement via a § 1983 claim is precluded.20 The
modern test used to determine if there are rights enforceable by
individuals under § 1983 is the Gonzaga/Blessing test.21 The first step of
this analysis is to ask whether the statute contains “explicit right-or
duty-creating language.”22 The second step is to determine whether “the
statute clearly provides rights which are specific and not amorphous.”23
Finally, the language of the statute must be mandatory, rather than
precatory.24
Prior to the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court on private
rights of action, the Court implied a private right of action under the
VRA.25 In Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, the Supreme Court held that §

14. Id. at 126, 133; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through PL 115-68, approved
10/06/17).
15. Id. at 133.
16. Id. at 129, 133.
17. Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1290.
18. Tokaji, supra note 10, at 133.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 135.
21. Schwier, 340 F. 3d at 1296; Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (rejecting a § 1983
claim because no personal rights were created under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of
1974); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997) (rejecting a § 1983 claim because the Social Security
Act did not give rise to individualized rights).
22. Schwier, 340 F. 3d at 1296.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1297.
25. See Tokaji, supra note 10, at 129, 133; Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
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5 of the VRA26 is enforceable through a private right of action, even
though the VRA “does not explicitly grant or deny private parties
authorization to seek a declaratory judgment.”27 The Court relied on
precedent, holding that a federal statute passed to protect a class of
citizens implies a right of action, even though it did not specifically
authorize members of the class to sue.28 The Court focused on the
guarantee of the statute that no person shall be denied the right to vote
for failure to comply with unapproved enactments under § 5, holding
that this would be an “empty promise” without the option for private
citizens to seek judicial enforcement.29
The Supreme Court began its turn away from the implication of
private rights of action in Cannon v. University of Chicago in 1979.30
The majority in Cannon implied a private right of action, but Justice
Powell’s dissent laid the foundation for the Court rejecting implied
private remedies in future cases.31
In Cannon, the plaintiff alleged that her admission to medical school
was denied on the basis of sex, in violation of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.32 The Court implied a private right of action, in
part based on the rights created by the statute, legislative history, the
similarity between the language of the statute and that of the statute in
Allen, the purpose of the statute, and whether the subject matter was
better handled by the States.33 Justice Powell challenged this holding in
his dissent, arguing that judicial implication of private rights of action
should end.34 Justice Powell argued that implied rights of action violate
the doctrine of separation of powers because the decision to provide a
private civil remedy is a legislative function.35 He also addressed
Supreme Court precedent, in which he described Allen in a benign
way.36 Overall, Justice Powell advanced the position that, “[a]bsent the
most compelling evidence of affirmative congressional intent, a federal
court should not infer a private cause of action.”37 Since Cannon was
26. Section 5 of the VRA requires covered states to receive declaratory judgment that changes to
the states’ election laws do not have the purpose or effect of denying the right to vote on the basis of
race or color. 393 U.S. at 548-49.
27. Id. at 554.
28. Id. at 557.
29. Id.
30. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
31. Fallon, supra note 7, at 739. As stated by Fallon, et al., “Justice Powell lost the battle in
Cannon, but he won the war.” Id.
32. 441 U.S. at 680.
33. Id. at 689-90, 694, 703, 708.
34. Id. at 730 (Powell, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 730-731 (Powell, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 737 (Powell, J., dissenting).
37. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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decided in 1979, the Court has gravitated much closer to Justice
Powell’s position requiring clear evidence of congressional intent to
imply a private remedy.38
The Supreme Court again implied a private right of action under the
VRA in 1996 in Morse v. Republican Party.39 The Court addressed the
substantive issue of whether § 5 of the VRA required preclearance of the
political party’s decision, and the procedural issue of whether the parties
were permitted to sue under a private right of action to enforce § 10 of
the VRA.40 The Court cited to Cannon for the principle that it must
consider the legal context in which the legislation was enacted.41 As in
Cannon, the Court here found that “Congress acted against a ‘backdrop’
of decisions in which implied causes of action were regularly found.”42
The Court stated that it would be “anomalous” to hold that § 10 is not
enforceable by private action, while the Court has previously held other
sections to be enforceable, despite the lack of express authorizing
language in all of the sections.43 The Court relied on precedent and
legislative history to support its conclusion that § 10 of the VRA is
enforceable by private citizens.44
Alexander v. Sandoval is an oft-cited, modern example of the
Supreme Court’s trend of reticence toward implying a private right of
action.45 In Sandoval, the Court addressed the issue of whether private
citizens may sue to enforce regulations promulgated under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.46 The Court held that there was no rightscreating language in the statute, under which the regulation was
promulgated.47 The majority remained resolute in refusing to imply a
private right of action without clear congressional intent.48 The
Sandoval Court rejected the Court’s prior reliance on the legal context
of the enactment of the statute, holding instead that legal context matters
only to the extent that it clarifies the text of the statute.49 The Supreme
38. Tokaji, supra note 10, at 131-2.
39. 517 U.S. 186 (1996).
40. Id. at 190. § 10 of the VRA prohibits poll taxes as a precondition to voting. Id.
41. Id. at 230-31.
42. Id. at 231 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 698-99).
43. Morse, 517 U.S. at 232.
44. Id. at 230-34.
45. 532 U.S. 275 (2001). The Plaintiffs argued that Alabama’s English-only policy for
administering state driver’s licenses violated a Department of Justice regulation because it subjected
non-English speakers to discrimination based on their national origin. Id. at 279.
46. Id. at 278.
47. Id. at 288.
48. Id. at 287. As stated in the majority opinion by Justice Scalia, “[h]aving sworn off the habit
of venturing beyond Congress’s intent, we will not accept respondent’s invitation to have one last drink”
Id.
49. Id. at 287-88. The Court states that only three prior cases that have implied private rights of
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Court implied a private right of action as late as 1996 in Morse, yet
neither the majority nor dissent mentioned Morse, a recent holding at the
time.50 Sandoval exemplifies the Supreme Court’s trend toward a much
more restrictive view of implied rights of action.51
B. The Voting Rights Act52
Congress enacted the VRA “to provide means of further securing and
protecting the civil rights of persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States.”53 The VRA protects the civil rights of Americans by ensuring
that the right to vote is not affected because of their race, color, or
previous condition of servitude.54 The VRA was originally codified as
part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which was codified under 42
U.S.C. § 1971, but is not codified under 52 U.S.C. § 10101.55 In part,
the VRA prohibits anyone from acting under the color of law to
deny the right of any individual to vote in any election because of
an error or omission on any record or paper relating to any
application, registration, or other act requisite to voting, if such
error or omission is not material in determining whether such
individual is qualified under State law to vote in such election.56
Section § 10101(c) of the VRA was added to the statute by the Civil
Rights Act of 1957 and provides that when any person has or is going to
engage in conduct that would “deprive any other person of any right of
privilege secured by subsection (a) or (b), the Attorney General may
institute . . .” a civil action for injunctive relief.57 Courts disagree as to
whether this provision providing for enforcement by the Attorney
General precludes a private right of action for individual voters.

action have found legal context to be relevant, but the cases it cites ignores Morse, a case more recent
than the others cited. Id.; Morse v. Republican Party, 517 U.S. 186 (1996).
50. Fallon, supra note 7, at 735.
51. Tokaji, supra note 10, at 133.
52. 52 U.S.C.S. § 10101 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through PL 115-60, approved 9/15/17).
53. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957).
54. 52 U.S.C.S. § 10101(a)(1) (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through PL 115-60, approved
9/15/17)
55. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1971 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through PL 115-61, approved 9/27/17). The
statute will be referred to in this Comment by the name used by the cited court, which largely depends
upon the time during which the case was decided.
56. 52 U.S.C.S. § 10101(a)(2)(B) (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through PL 115-60, approved
9/15/17)
57. 52 U.S.C.S. § 10101(c) (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through PL 115-60, approved 9/15/17);
Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1294.
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C. The Circuit Split
Two modern cases from federal courts of appeals exemplify the split
among the federal circuits as to whether an individual has a private right
of action under the VRA of 1965: Northeast Ohio Coalition for the
Homeless v. Husted and Schwier v. Cox.58 While both courts agree that
the VRA provides for enforcement by the Attorney General, they
disagree about the right of individuals to sue to enforce their rights.59
The Supreme Court has declined to resolve the split among circuits.60
This section discusses each of the main cases in turn.
1. Schwier v. Cox61
The plaintiffs, Deborah Schwier, Theodore Schwier, and Michael
Craig, sued the Georgia Secretary of the State, Cathy Cox, seeking
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.62 The Plaintiffs claimed that
Georgia’s voter registration procedure violated § 7 of the Privacy Act of
1974 and § 1971 of the VRA by requiring voters to supply their social
security numbers to register.63 Relevant to this Comment, the Plaintiffs
argued that Georgia’s requirement that voters supply their social
security numbers violates § 1971(a)(2)(B) of the VRA because the
social security numbers are not “material” in determining whether an
individual is eligible to vote.64
In order to bring their case under the VRA, the Plaintiffs contended
that when Congress gave the authority to enforce the VRA to the
Attorney General, Congress merely added a means of enforcing the
statute but did not take away the previously existing remedy of a private
right of action via 42 U.S.C. § 1983.65 In response, the Defendant
argued that the VRA may only be enforced by the Attorney General, the
method provided by the statute.66 In the alternative, the Defendants
argued that even if the statute may be enforced by a private right of
action, the Plaintiffs’ claim is moot because Georgia has since modified
its voter registration form.67

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

837 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2016); 340 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2003).
Ne. Coalition, 837 F.3d at 630; Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1296.
Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 137 S. Ct. 2265 (2017).
340 F.3d 1284 (11th Cir. 2003).
Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1285.
Id. at 1285-6.
Id. at 1286-87.
Id. at 1287.
Id.
Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1287.
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a. The District Court Decision
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
found that the Plaintiffs could not bring a private right of action for
violations of the Privacy Act or the VRA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.68 The
district court found that Congress added § 1971(c) to the statute with the
intention of foreclosing the possibility of a private right of action.69 The
District Court relied on the Sixth Circuit’s holding in McKay v.
Thompson that § 1971 of the VRA is enforceable only by the Attorney
General.70
The district court granted a preliminary injunction, allowing the
Plaintiffs to vote in the election without providing their social security
numbers.71 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
Defendant for both the Privacy Act and VRA claims.72 The Plaintiffs
appealed the district court’s decision.73
b. The Eleventh Circuit Decision
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reviewed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo.74 The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis of the private right of
action issue by looking at the language of the VRA and the legislative
history.75 The court found that § 1971(a)(2)(B) was “intended to address
the practice of requiring unnecessary information for voter registration
with the intent that such requirements would increase the number of
errors or omissions on the application forms, thus providing an excuse to
disqualify potential voters.”76 Additionally, the court reviewed House
Report 291 and found that the statute’s purpose was “to provide means
of further securing and protecting the civil rights of persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States.”77 The Eleventh Circuit noted that
nothing in the House Judiciary Committee Report indicated that the
Committee intended for the provision granting the Attorney General

68. Id. at 1286.
69. Id. at 1294.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 1286
72. Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1286.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1287. De novo review means that an appellate court may freely review a trial court’s
findings on matters of law, but not on findings of fact. 5 Am Jur 2d Appellate Review § 646. Deference
is owed to the trial court for findings of fact, but not for findings concerning an issue of law. Id.
75. Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1294.
76. Id.
77. Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1295 (emphasis in original).
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enforcement authority foreclosed the continued enforcement by
individuals under § 1983.78 The court found that the language of the
Report and the purpose of the statute do not support the conclusion that
Congress merely intended to substitute one form of enforcement for
another.79 Rather, Congress likely wanted to expand the protection
provided by the statute.80
In addition to the legislative history, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the
timing of the enactment of the statute.81 The provision giving the
Attorney General the authority to enforce § 1971 was not added to the
statute until 1957 with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1957.82
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that this timing meant that before 1957,
individuals could sue to enforce § 1971 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.83
Next, the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case law cited by the district
court. After analyzing the case law relied upon by the district court, the
Eleventh Circuit reviewed Supreme Court cases that held that other
sections of the VRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(c) and 1973(h), could be
enforced by an individual through a private right of action, even though
those sections of the statute also provide for enforcement by the
Attorney General.84 First, in Allen v. State Board of Elections, the
Supreme Court held that “the possibility of enforcement by the Attorney
General did not preclude enforcement by private citizens,” which the
Eleventh Circuit court recognized was contrary to the Sixth Circuit’s
holding.85 Second, in Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, the
Supreme Court held that a private right of action to enforce the VRA’s
prohibition on the poll tax was not foreclosed by the provision that gave
the Attorney General the authority to sue for violations.86 In both of
these Supreme Court cases, the Court held that private citizens could sue
to enforce other provisions of the VRA. In the process of reviewing
Supreme Court precedent, the court also explicitly rejected the Sixth
Circuit’s position on the issue.
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that
neither the provision for enforcement by the Attorney General nor the
failure of Congress to expressly include a private right of action require
the conclusion that Congress intended for no private right of action to

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1295.
Id.
Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1295.
Id. at 1296.
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exist.87 From this conclusion that a private right of action is not
precluded, the Eleventh Circuit then moved to the issue of whether the
VRA “creates rights enforceable by individuals under § 1983.”88
To determine whether a statute creates rights enforceable by
individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Eleventh Circuit applied the
Gonzaga/Blessing analysis.89 Courts use this analysis to determine
whether Congress created an individual right in a statute that is
enforceable by the individual.90 The Eleventh Circuit applied this
framework to the Materiality Provision of the VRA.91
The court found that the language of § 1971(a)(2)(B) was clearly
analogous to the right-creating language cited by the Supreme Court in
the Gonzaga case.92 Next, the court held that the rights protected are
specific and not amorphous because the statute protects an individual’s
right to vote generally, but also specifically protects the right of a
potential voter to not be disqualified for failure to provide immaterial
information on a voter registration form.93 Last, the court held that the
language of the statute was mandatory because it included the phrase
“no person . . . shall . . . deny the right of any individual to vote . . . .”94
Since § 1971 satisfied the Gonzaga/Blessing analysis, the Eleventh
Circuit held that the VRA may be enforced by a private right of action
under § 1983.95 Even under the Supreme Court’s most stringent test, the
Eleventh Circuit held that the VRA is privately enforceable.96
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
district court’s ruling, ultimately finding that § 1971 of the VRA permits
enforcement by a private right of action under § 1983.97
2. Northeast Ohio Coalition for the Homeless v. Husted98
The Plaintiffs in this case were the Northeast Ohio Coalition for the
Homeless, Service Employees International Union, Columbus Coalition
for the Homeless, and the Ohio Democratic Party.99 The Plaintiffs sued
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1296.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1296. See note 17.
Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1296-97.
Id. at 1297.
Id.
Tokaji, supra note 10, at 141.
Schwier, 340 F.3d at 1297.
837 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 620-21.
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the Defendants—the State of Ohio and the Secretary of State, Jon
Husted—to enjoin the enforcement of two voter-identification and
provisional-ballot laws, Senate Bill 205 (“SB 205”) and Senate Bill 216
(“SB 216”).100 This litigation proceeded for many years, with multiple
motions heard at both the district and circuit court levels.101
The first of the challenged laws, SB 205, changed the requirements
for absentee ballots by requiring the birthdate and address fields on
absentee ballots to be accurately completed, reducing the amount of
time for corrections to be submitted, and prohibiting election officials
from assisting voters, unless the voter is unable to complete their ballot
because of blindness, disability, or illiteracy.102 The other law
challenged by Plaintiffs, SB 216, made similar changes to the
requirements for provisional ballots by requiring the birthdate and
address fields to be accurately completed and by reducing the number of
days a voter has to cure a provisional ballot.103
The parties entered a consent decree104 in 2010, which required the
Secretary of State to inform election boards to count provisional ballots
of voters whose affirmation forms had an accurate name, verified
signature, and the last four digits of the voter’s social security
number.105 The consent decree also listed grounds for which a
provisional ballot could not be rejected, including failure to provide a
birthdate or address tied to a building.106 The consent decree was
extended through the end of 2016.107
Following the extension of the consent decree, the Southern District
Court of Ohio permitted Plaintiffs to file a supplemental compliant to

100. Id.
101. NE Coalition, 837 F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2016).
102. Id. at 619-20. In Ohio, any eligible voter may apply for an absentee ballot, which requires a
name, signature, registration address, date of birth, and a form of identification. Id. at 619. When voting
with an absentee ballot, voters must also complete an identification envelope, which requires the voter’s
name, signature, voting residence, and birthdate. Id. The name and signature on the envelope must be
proper for the ballot to be counted, but SB 205 adds the birthdate and address fields to this requirement.
Id. The time allowed for corrections to the absentee ballots was reduced from ten days to seven days
after Election Day. Id.
103. Ne. Coalition, 837 F.3d at 620. Ohio voters may use an in-person provisional ballot if he or
she does not appear on the precinct’s list of eligible voters when he or she goes to vote during the earlyvoting period or on Election Day. Id. at 618. The affirmation form completed by provisional ballot
voters also doubles as a voter registration form for the following year if the voter was found to not be
registered during the current voting year. Id. at 620. The time allowed for a voter to cure a provisional
ballot was reduced from ten to seven days after Election Day. Id.
104. A consent decree is an agreement entered into by the consent of the parties involved; the
agreement is not a judicial decision, but the court retains jurisdiction over the agreement. Consent
decree, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
105. Ne. Coalition, 837 F.3d at 620-21.
106. Id. at 621.
107. Id.
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challenge the voter-identification requirements more generally.108 The
Plaintiffs asserted ten counts against the State and the Secretary.109 The
relevant claim for this Comment is the immaterial error claim under the
Materiality Provision of the VRA.
The Plaintiffs argued that the Ohio laws violated the Materiality
Provision of the VRA because it denied citizens the right to vote based
on errors or omissions on absentee or provisional ballots that were not
material to determining the citizens’ eligibility to vote.110 The Plaintiffs
relied on the Eleventh’s Circuit’s analysis and holding from Schwier to
support their argument that a private right of action is permitted to
enforce the Materiality Provision.111 The Plaintiffs argued that § 1983
expressly authorizes the private lawsuit because the deprivation of rights
was perpetrated by government officials.112 Alternatively, the Plaintiffs
argued that the language of the statute itself and the legislative history
support an implied private right of action.113 To support this argument,
the Plaintiffs cited the Attorney General, who testified before Congress
that the amendments to the VRA “are not taking away the right of the
individual to start his own action . . . private people will retain the right
they have now to sue in their own name.”114 Ultimately, the Plaintiffs
sought a permanent injunction against the above-stated election laws.115

108. Ne. Coalition, 837 F.3d at 621. A court may permit a party to serve a supplemental pleading
for any transaction, occurrence, or event that happened after the date of the pleading to be
supplemented. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). The Sixth Circuit permitted a supplemental complaint because “SB
216 ‘ero[ded]’ the consent decree’s protections and because both SB 205 and SB 216 related to the
original complaint, which challenged Ohio’s voter-identification requirements more generally.” NE
Coalition, 837 F.3d at 621. The Sixth Circuit held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
granting the plaintiffs’ motion for a supplemental complaint. Id. at 625.
109. Id. at 621. The ten claims are as follows: (1) a viewpoint discrimination claim under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
for a fundamentally unfair voting system; (3) a claim under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment for violation of procedural due process; (4) a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment of undue burden; (5) a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment for lack of uniform standards; (6) a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment for arbitrary and disparate treatment; (7) a claim of intentional
discrimination under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; (8) a claim of vote denial under the
Voting Rights Act; (9) a claim of immaterial error under the Voting Rights Act; and (10) a literacy test
claim under the Voting Rights Act. Id.
110. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 23-24, Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 137 S.
Ct. 2265 (2017) [hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari].
111. Id. 34-37.
112. Id. at 42.
113. Id. at 42-43. The Plaintiffs argued that the doctrine against implied repeal supports this
conclusion. Id. at 43.
114. Id. at 21.
115. NE Coalition, 837 F.3d at 621.
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a. The District Court Decision
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
heard a bench trial in March 2016 on the supplemental complaint.116
The district court entered judgment for the Plaintiffs on the undue
burden and vote denial claims, and for Defendants on all other counts,
including the immaterial error claim.117 The Defendants appealed the
undue burden and vote denial claims, and the Plaintiffs cross-appealed
the uniform standards, literacy test, due process, intentional
discrimination, and immaterial error claims.118
b. The Sixth Circuit Decision
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and factual
findings for clear error.119 In evaluating the claim under the Materiality
Provision of the VRA, the Sixth Circuit cited McKay v. Thompson120 to
hold that there is not a private right of action under this provision of the
VRA.121
In McKay, a pro se litigant filed a lawsuit against two Tennessee state
election officials to enjoin Tennessee from requiring its citizens to
disclose their social security numbers as a condition for voter
registration.122 The plaintiff brought this claim under the Privacy Act of
1974, the National Voter Registration Act, and the Civil Rights Act of
1964.123 The plaintiff also raised constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, such as a claim that the enforcement of the Tennessee law
infringed upon his free exercise of religion and that his right to vote was
unconstitutionally burdened.124 The Eastern District of Tennessee
rejected these claims, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment
for the defendants upon de novo review.125 Relevant here, the plaintiff
argued that his social security number was immaterial to determining his
qualification to vote, and therefore his omission could not be used to

116. Id.
117. Id. at 622.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 625.
120. 226 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2000).
121. Ne. Coalition, 837 F.3d at 630.
122. 226 F.3d at 754.
123. Id. at 755-56; Pub. L. No. 93-579 § 7; 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg-3(c)(2)(B); 42 U.S.C. §
1971(a)(2)(B) (this section is now codified as the Voting Rights Act under 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B)).
124. McKay, 226 F.3d at 756-57.
125. Id. at 754.
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refuse his voter registration form under the Materiality Provision.126 The
Sixth Circuit cited the language of the statute and Willing v. Lake Orion
Community Sch. Bd. of Trustees127 from the Eastern District of
Michigan to hold that the provision for the Attorney General to enforce
the Civil Rights Act under § 1971(c) precludes private citizens from
doing so under a private right of action.128
In Willing, a pro se litigant sued multiple defendants, including her
local school board of trustees, the Oakland County board of canvassers,
and the Oakland County Prosecutor’s office.129 The plaintiff asserted
violations of the United States Constitution and numerous federal and
state statutes, stemming from technical violations of Michigan election
law in two school elections and two recounts of the elections.130 These
claims included an alleged violation of § 1971(b) of the VRA, which
prohibits intimidation, threats, and coercion in elections for the
President, Vice President, presidential elector, Delegates, or
Commissioners from the Territories.131 The court concluded, based on
the language of the statutes and Good v. Roy,132 a district court decision
from Kansas, that the VRA does not permit a private right of action.133
The court stated that the VRA is enforceable by the Attorney General,
not by private citizens, under § 1971(c).134 Importantly, the court held
that even if it implied a private right of action, the claim would fail
because the Plaintiff’s claim did not fit the language of the statute.135
In Good, the Plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief under
the VRA for protection against misleading statements by a candidate for
public office.136 The court found that this protection is not present
within the VRA.137 The court stated that “the unambiguous language of
Section 1971 will not permit us to imply a private right of action”
because subsection (c) provides for enforcement by the Attorney
General, with no mention of enforcement by private persons, and
because the purpose of the VRA is to protect against racial

126. Id. at 756.
127. 924 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
128. McKay, 226 F.3d at 756.
129. 924 F. Supp. at 817.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 820.
132. 459 F. Supp. 403 (D.Kan. 1978).
133. Willing, 934 F. Supp. at 820.
134. Id.
135. Id. The statute enumerates the types of elections to which it applies, but school board
elections are not included in the list. Id. Therefore, the court concludes that the claim would be
dismissed regardless of whether the court implied a private right of action. Id.
136. 459 F. Supp. at 404-05.
137. Id. at 405.
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discrimination, of which there is no allegation in this case.138 Finally,
the court held that a private right of action is not available under § 1983
because there is no allegation of state action.139
In NE Coalition, the Sixth Circuit followed the precedent set by
McKay because “[a] panel of this court may not overturn binding
precedent because a published prior panel decision remains controlling
authority,” unless the Supreme Court issues an inconsistent decision or
the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.140 The
Sixth Circuit followed the precedent set by McKay regarding the private
right of action under the VRA without further analysis.141 Because
Congress included a provision for enforcement by the Attorney General,
the statute precluded private rights of action.142 The Sixth Circuit
followed binding precedent and affirmed the district court’s decision in
favor of the Defendants for the immaterial error claim.143
c. The Supreme Court Decision
The Sixth Circuit’s decision in NE Coalition left the issue of whether
there is a private right of action under the VRA ripe for intervention
from the Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court declined to
resolve the split between the circuit courts in 2017 when it denied the
Plaintiffs’ petition for writ of certiorari.144
IV. PROMOTING PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT AND WHY IT IS DESIRABLE IN
THE CONTEXT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT
The Eleventh Circuit’s holding that there is a private right of action
under the VRA more thoroughly and accurately analyzes the relevant
issues under the modern tests than does the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion,
and results in a more satisfactory outcome. This section will discuss the
circuit courts’ analyses, briefly review the Supreme Court precedent
discussed earlier in this Comment, and explain the public policy reasons
supporting the Eleventh Circuit’s outcome.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 405-06.
Id. at 406.
Ne. Coalition, 837 F.3d at 630.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 638.
Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 137 S. Ct. 2265 (2017).
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A. Circuit Court Analyses
The Eleventh Circuit and the Sixth Circuit both faced the same issue
in Schwier and NE Coalition: whether the Materiality Provision of the
VRA is enforceable via a private right of action. Even though the courts
considered the same issue, the analyses of the courts differed greatly.
In Schwier, the Eleventh Circuit provided an extensive analysis of the
issue of private enforcement under the Materiality Provision. First, the
Eleventh Circuit analyzed the statutory language, legislative history,
timing of enactment, and Supreme Court precedent to determine that
neither the provision for enforcement by the Attorney General, nor the
failure of Congress to explicitly include a provision for a private right of
action, mean that Congress did not intend for private enforcement to be
possible.145 The court concluded that a private right of action was not
precluded based on the foregoing reasons.146 Second, the court
performed a § 1983 analysis, using the Gonzaga/Blessing test.147 The
court found that the Materiality Provision contained right-creating
language, specific rights, and mandatory language, meaning that a
private right of action could be implied under § 1983.148 With this
thorough, multi-step analysis, the Eleventh Circuit logically supported
its conclusion.
In stark contrast, the Sixth Circuit rejected a private right of action
under the VRA with a “brief, conclusory, and unsatisfying” analysis.149
As stated by the Plaintiffs in the case, “[t]he Sixth Circuit’s analysis of
the issue is so cursory that it is easier to quote than to summarize.”150 In
NE Coalition, the Sixth Circuit cited precedent from the Circuit, which
states that the enforcement of the VRA by the Attorney General
precludes enforcement through a private right of action.151 The Sixth
Circuit briefly cited to McKay and stated that it may not decide a case
inconsistently with the Circuit’s precedent unless the Supreme Court
issued an inconsistent decision.152
However, upon further examination of this line of precedent, there is
not a strong analysis in any of the cases to support such an
indiscriminate reliance by the Sixth Circuit. The analysis in McKay is
even shorter than the cursory analysis provided in NE Coalition, relying
upon Willing v. Lake Orion Community Sch. Bd. of Trustees as the basis
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

See supra notes 75-88 and accompanying text.
See supra note 87-88 and accompanying text.
See supra note 89-91 and accompanying text.
See supra note 92-93 and accompanying text.
Tokaji, supra note 10, at 140.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, p. 33.
See supra note 141-42 and accompanying text.
See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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for the conclusion that “[s]ection 1971 is enforceable by the Attorney
General, not private citizens.”153 The Sixth Circuit in McKay briefly
discussed the issue of a private right of action under the VRA, citing a
lower court in Willing as the authority for the analysis.154
The Willing court provides another brief analysis of the issue. The
McKay court cited Willing for the holding that the VRA is enforceable
by the Attorney General, not private citizens. The Willing court indeed
stated this, but did not offer any analysis to support the statement.
Rather, it cited to another district court case, Good from the District of
Kansas.155
The Good court concluded that the language of the statute providing
for enforcement by the Attorney General precluded the court from
implying a private right of action.156 The court reasoned that the
statutory language was unambiguous but provided no further reasoning
or legal support.157
There are a few problems with this string of cases in the precedent
relied upon by the Sixth Circuit. First, the Willing court appears to be
quick to dismiss the issue of the private right of action because the
plaintiff failed to properly raise a claim under the statute.158 This begs
the question of whether the court would have provided a more thorough
analysis of the plaintiff’s ability to sue had the claim been viable under
the statute. The court appears to brush off the issue because the ultimate
result of the case does not change, regardless of their conclusion on the
issue of whether to imply a private right of action. The irrelevance of
this decision in the case raises the question of whether this should be
trusted by a higher court as precedent, without further analysis. For the
Sixth Circuit to rely on McKay, it should have provided further analysis
to support the precedent case’s reasoning.
Second, lower court decisions are not binding on higher courts, but
the Sixth Circuit does not provide an explanation for why it chose to
follow the lower court decision.159 The Eastern District of Michigan in
Willing followed the case law from the District of Kansas in Good,
which is also not binding authority over the court.160 The Sixth Circuit
153. McKay 226 F.3d at 756.
154. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
157. Id.
158. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
159. Lower court decisions can serve as persuasive authority for higher courts, but lower court
decisions are not binding on higher courts. 18-134 Moore’s Federal Practice – Civil § 134.02(1)(c)
(2017).
160. While federal district court decisions can serve as persuasive authority for other federal
district courts, the decisions of district courts are not binding authority for other district courts. 18-134
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then cited the Eastern District of Michigan in McKay, which is not
binding on the Sixth Circuit, without additional analysis. Finally, the
Sixth Circuit in NE Coalition cited McKay, stating that court could not
rule contrary to its precedent, absent an intervention by the Supreme
Court. The Sixth Circuit failed to explain why it relied upon these lower
court cases to establish the precedent of the Circuit in McKay, and
refused to reassess this decision in NE Coalition. The Sixth Circuit has
not provided a satisfactory reason for its decision to preclude rights of
action for individuals to enforce their rights under the VRA in either
case that has addressed the issue.
The contrast between the Sixth and Eleventh Circuit analyses cannot
be easily reconciled. The reasoning behind the Eleventh Circuit analysis
is easier to follow, much more thorough, and more convincing than that
of the Sixth Circuit.
B. Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court has implied private rights of action under the
VRA in prior cases, such as Allen and Morse.161 The Court implied a
private right of action in Morse, even after the general contraction of
implied rights of action in the post-Cannon case law, suggesting that a
majority of the Court has considered private enforcement of the VRA to
be especially important.162 The Morse Court acknowledged that other
sections of the VRA have been held to be privately enforceable despite
the lack of express language in the statute, so it would be inconsistent to
hold that other sections are not privately enforceable.163 Based on the
precedent cited above, and the judicial context in which it was decided,
the Court has not precluded private enforcement of the VRA, and
appears to support the implication of the right to sue for private citizens
in this context.
C. Public Policy Rationale
In addition to the superior legal analysis performed by the Eleventh
Circuit and the support found in Supreme Court precedent, there are
public policy reasons that support implying a private right of action
under the VRA.
First, enforcement by the Attorney General is not an adequate
Moore’s Federal Practice – Civil § 134.02(1)(d) (2017).
161. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Morse v. Republican Party, 517 U.S.
186 (1996).
162. See supra notes 38, 44 and accompanying text.
163. Morse, 517 U.S. at 232.
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substitute for private enforcement. With the limited resources of the
Department of Justice, many meritorious voting rights violations will
likely go unchallenged.164 The Department of Justice has limited time,
staff, and funding, making it unreasonable to think that enforcement by
the Attorney General will be sufficient, given how lengthy and resourceintensive many voting rights cases can be.165
Furthermore, the federal government does not have an administrative
agency able to issue guidance on the meaning of federal election law.166
Without such an agency, federal courts are the only way in which
citizens can receive authoritative guidance on the rights protected under
the VRA.167 With federal courts as the only means of guidance and
enforcement for election statutes, enforcement by the Department of
Justice is insufficient to handle all violations. Private enforcement of the
VRA would provide a broader opportunity for the country’s elections to
proceed in accordance with the requisite laws.
Additionally, the partisan political climate of the executive branch
will likely influence whether the Attorney General chooses to pursue
these lawsuits. The Attorney General’s priorities are subject to change,
both during a single administration, and between the tenures of different
Attorney Generals.168 With the limited resources of the Department of
Justice discussed above, the Attorney General must make choices about
how to allocate those resources. Depending on the political climate, the
priorities of the leadership will affect the allocation of the Department’s
resources, meaning other duties of the Department of Justice could be
prioritized over the enforcement of the VRA. If this occurs, individuals
should have another means to remedy the violation of their voting rights.
Further, except for the rare instances in which the federal government
decides to get involved in enforcing the statute, most interpretation and
enforcement is performed by state and local officials.169 The partisan
affiliation of these officials creates an inherent conflict of interest,
jeopardizing fair and consistent enforcement of election statutes. Private
enforcement of the VRA would allow for more consistent interpretation
and enforcement of the law.
Between the limited resources of the Department of Justice, and the
partisan fluctuations in the priorities of the Attorney General,
enforcement solely by the Attorney General is insufficient. While these
resources and priorities fluctuate, individual citizens’ need for robust
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Brief for the Brennan Center for Justice, supra note 3, at 29.
Id. at 29-30.
Tokaji, supra note 10, at 119.
Id.
Brief for the Brennan Center for Justice, supra note 3, at 31.
Tokaji, supra note 10, at 114.
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protection of their voting rights remains constant.170 As stated by the
Allen Court, the VRA’s “laudable goal could be severely hampered . . .
if each citizen were required to depend solely on litigation instituted at
the discretion of the Attorney General.”171 To further the goal of the
VRA, individuals should be permitted to sue to ensure that their rights
are not violated.
Next, the VRA serves a public interest by protecting the civil rights of
all United States citizens. Enforcement of the VRA by the Attorney
General can further this collective interest, but private enforcement
provides a great supplement to furthering this common good. One may
argue that private plaintiffs, often including interest groups, are not the
best option to enforce this collective interest because they will have their
own agendas and may not serve that interest.172 However, the rights
protected under the VRA further the systemic interest of protecting civil
rights, regardless of who enforces them. The goal of the VRA is to
promote fairness and equality in the United States’ electoral system.
This goal strengthens American democracy, regardless of whether the
rights are enforced to benefit one individual or a large group of people.
Therefore, supplemental enforcement by private citizens will help
further the legislature’s goal, not diminish it.
In addition to prior support from the Supreme Court stated above, the
Attorney General and the United States government have expressed
support for private enforcement of the VRA. In Allen, the Attorney
General urged the Court to find a right of action for private citizens.173
Additionally, the United States government encouraged a private right
of action as amicus curiae174 in Morse.175 Endorsement from these
influential political actors demonstrates the widespread support for a
private right of action. The Attorney General’s endorsement is
significant because the Attorney General is the other actor with authority
to enforce the statute.
Importantly, the circuit split and variations among lower courts on the
issue of whether an individual is permitted to sue to enforce his or her
rights under the VRA could produce a chilling effect on these types of
cases. As discussed in an amicus curiae brief for NE Coalition,
“uncertainty concerning private enforcement is likely to deter
individuals and groups from pursuing voting rights cases at all,”
170. Brief for the Brennan Center for Justice, supra note 3, at 31.
171. 393 U.S. at 556.
172. Michael R. Dimino, Sr. et al., Understanding Election Law and Voting Rights 238 (2017).
173. Allen, 393 U.S. at 557, n. 23.
174. An amicus curiae is “[a] party that is not involved in litigation but gives expert testimony
when the court asks. They can support public interest not being addressed in the trial.” Amicus curiae,
Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
175. Morse, 517 U.S. 231-32.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol86/iss4/8

20

Hurd: Promoting Private Enforcement of the Voting Rights Act and the Ma

2018]

PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT

1399

especially in cases in which a relatively small number of citizens are
affected.176 The denial of a private right of action in some courts could
have a “corrosive and discouraging impact” on individual initiative to
protect their rights under the VRA.177 The potential chilling effect of the
uncertainty created by the variations in case law is contrary to the goal
of the VRA legislation: to protect against racial discrimination by
preventing abuse of state voting procedures.178
Finally, a private right of action under the VRA could have a
deterrent effect on states. If states are more likely to be challenged on
violations of the Materiality Provision, they may be more reluctant to
push the boundaries when enacting statutes and regulations. Private
enforcement of the VRA allows individuals to enforce their own rights,
furthering the collective interest of fairness and equality in elections,
while also deterring future violations of the statute.
Based on the disadvantages of enforcement of the VRA solely by the
Attorney General, the support from significant political actors, the
potential chilling effect of the current state of relevant case law, and the
potential deterrent effect of private enforcement, courts should permit
private enforcement of the VRA by individual citizens. Private
enforcement will further the public policies underlying the VRA by
allowing more violations to be challenged and by incentivizing state
officials to follow the statutory obligations more closely by opening the
door to private litigants.
V. CONCLUSION
The split of authority among United States courts regarding private
enforcement of the VRA should be resolved in favor of the Eleventh
Circuit’s conclusion. A private right of action should be permitted to
enforce the Materiality Provision of the VRA. The legal analysis used
by the Eleventh Circuit is more thorough than the Sixth Circuit’s
analysis, and results in more satisfying outcome. The Eleventh Circuit
used a methodical, multi-step analysis that examined the legislative
history, Supreme Court precedent, and applied the Supreme Court’s test
for allowing a private right of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.179
Additionally, public policy considerations support permitting a private
right of action for individuals whose rights have been violated under the
VRA. In conclusion, a private right of action should be implied under
the Materiality Provision of the VRA.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Brief of the Brennan Center for Justice, supra note 3, at 14.
Id. at 20-21.
Id. at 21.
See supra notes 75-95 and accompanying text.
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